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ABSTRACT 
 The rhetoric of the Trump administration has fomented a belief among the U.S. 
public that refugees are a source of terrorism and a growing threat to the security of 
American citizens. This rhetoric has been reinforced by executive orders, regulations, and 
policies that have severely restricted the number of refugees admitted to the United States 
since 2017 and subjected those who enter to enhanced screening and vetting in an attempt 
to mitigate this perceived threat. This thesis assesses the actual scope of threat posed to 
the security of the United States by resettled refugees. Looking at quantitative data for 
attempted and perpetrated attacks by refugees in the United States, this thesis concludes 
that the threat posed to the U.S. homeland by resettled refugees is so minimal as to be 
statistically insignificant. Analyzing well-known examples of resettled refugees who have 
been radicalized to terrorism abroad, this thesis also concludes that the true risk of 
radicalization lies in the failed integration of these refugees into American society. 
Preventing the ostracism of refugees through policy changes to the refugee admissions 
program may serve to mitigate this risk and cure the misperceived fear of refugees among 
the public. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the mid-2000s, a group of radicalized Somali-born American citizens sprang out 
of the refugee community in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area of Minnesota and returned to 
Somalia, where they received training from al-Shabab. There, they committed acts of 
violence and terrorism. This group’s radicalization led to one of the largest domestic 
counterterrorism investigations since 9/11. The investigation resulted in charges being 
brought against 14 persons in Minnesota in 2009 for participating in the recruitment of 
these Somali-Americans and funding their travels and training. Several were charged with 
attending terrorist training camps and fighting on behalf of al-Shabab.1 Since then, little 
has been done on a national level to assess the risk of radicalization within the resettled 
refugee population in the United States though new executive actions on immigration have 
attempted to address the perceived threat. While it is possible that the “Twin Cities 
travelers” were an anomaly, it is also possible that they illustrate what might happen when 
the risk of radicalization within an isolated community of refugees goes unmitigated. 
As a result of political rhetoric and the waves of attacks that have plagued Europe 
in recent years, the American public seems to perceive refugees as an ever-growing and 
substantial threat to the security of U.S. citizens.2 Executive orders, regulations, and 
policies under the Trump administration have reinforced these fears. The administration 
has sought to limit the annual number of refugee admissions—stemming the flow from 
certain “high-risk” countries, including Somalia—and enhance the vetting mechanisms 
used during the refugee admissions process.3 
 
1 U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota against Eight 
Defendants, Justice Department Announces,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, Minneapolis Division, 
November 23, 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2009/mp112309.htm. 
2 Caroline R. Nagel, “Southern Hospitality? Islamophobia and the Politicization of Refugees in South 
Carolina during the 2016 Election Season,” Southeastern Geographer 56, no. 3 (Fall 2016): 283–90, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/sgo.2016.0033; Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism 
after the Paris Attacks,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 16, no. 1 (April 2016): 158–67, 
https://refugeeresearch.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Nail-2016-The-figure-of-the-migrant.pdf. 
3 Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2018 comp.): 301. 
xii 
The Trump administration has sought to overhaul the United States Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP) based on the perceived threat of terrorism within this 
population. The refugee admissions cap for fiscal year 2018 had been set at 45,000, the 
lowest in the history of the program at that time.4 Fiscal year 2019 saw an even further 
reduction in the refugee admissions cap, at a limit of 30,000.5 The following fiscal year, 
2020, saw the greatest reduction by far, with an upper limit of 18,000 refugee admissions.6 
In addition to curtailing the number of admitted refugees, the administration also called for 
“extreme vetting” of those applicants. The Departments of Homeland Security and State 
have been instructed to implement enhanced screening and vetting for all immigration 
benefit applicants, including refugees.7 That same presidential memorandum also 
requested an assessment of the overall cost of USRAP and recommendations to limit  
those costs.8 
This thesis asks the following questions: Is radicalization of resettled refugees a 
significant threat to the security of the United States? Which factors contribute to the 
violent radicalization of resettled refugees within the United States or in other countries? 
What can be done to mitigate the risk of radicalization from within the resettled refugee 
community? To answer these questions, this thesis defines the actual scope of the threat to 
the United States posed by resettled refugees. “Resettled” refugees are those admitted to 
 
4 Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2018” 
(presidential memorandum to the secretary of state, Washington, DC: White House, 2017), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-state-4/; Oliver Laughland, 
“Donald Trump Caps Refugee Admissions in 2018 Historic Low,” Guardian, September 27, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/27/donald-trump-caps-refugee-admissions-2018-historic-
low. 
5 Presidential Determination No. 2019–01, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,091 (November 1, 2018), https://thefederal
register.org/83-FR/Issue-212/FR-2018-11-01.pdf. 
6 Presidential Determination No. 2020–04, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,903 (November 29, 2019), https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-11-29/pdf/2019-26082.pdf. 
7 Donald J. Trump, “Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening and Vetting of Applications for 
Visas and Other Immigration Benefits, Ensuring Enforcement of All Laws for Entry into the United States, 
and Increasing Transparency among Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government and for the 
American People” (presidential memorandum for the secretary of state, attorney general, and secretary of 




the United States under USRAP and do not include asylees or other classes of immigrants 
or non-immigrants who may reside in the United States. It looks at historical data to find 
incidents of terrorism perpetrated by resettled refugees in the United States and, using this 
data, assesses the risk of harm to U.S. persons from this population. It draws from known 
cases of radicalization among resettled refugees in the United States, Canada, and Australia 
that did not result in domestic terrorist attacks in those respective countries. These cases 
illustrate the factors that led these populations to radicalize and identify common trends. 
Over 40 years of data reveal only a handful of successful terrorist attacks 
perpetrated by refugees within the United States, of which only two were fatal. However, 
members of resettled refugee communities are being radicalized to participate in terrorist 
activity outside the United States—which is itself a threat to national security. This 
research seeks to determine what can be done to mitigate the risk of radicalization within 
the resettled refugee community and concludes that the root causes of radicalization are 
due to psychosocial and cultural issues experienced after resettlement that are not cured by 
limiting refugee admissions. To mitigate this risk, policymakers must reassess what steps 
are being taken to ensure integration of refugees into society instead of allowing for 
conditions that contribute to isolation and division between refugees and citizens of the 
United States. 
xiv 
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In the mid-2000s, a group of radicalized Somali-born American citizens sprang out 
of the refugee community in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area of Minnesota and returned to 
Somalia, where they received training from al-Shabab. There, they committed acts of 
violence and terrorism. This group’s radicalization led to one of the largest domestic 
counterterrorism investigations since 9/11. The investigation resulted in charges being 
brought against 14 persons in Minnesota in 2009 for participating in the recruitment of 
these Somali-Americans and funding their travels and training. Several were charged with 
attending terrorist training camps and fighting on behalf of al-Shabab.1 Since then, little 
has been done on a national level to assess the risk of radicalization within the resettled 
refugee population in the United States though new executive actions on immigration have 
attempted to address the perceived threat. While it is possible that the “Twin Cities 
travelers” were an anomaly, it is also possible that they illustrate what might happen when 
the risk of radicalization within an isolated community of refugees goes unmitigated. 
As a result of political rhetoric and the waves of attacks that have plagued Europe 
in recent years, the American public seems to perceive refugees as an ever-growing and 
substantial threat to the security of U.S. citizens.2 Executive orders, regulations, and 
policies under the Trump administration have reinforced these fears. The administration 
has sought to limit the annual number of refugee admissions—stemming the flow from 
certain “high-risk” countries, including Somalia—and enhance the vetting mechanisms 
used during the refugee admissions process.3 
 
1 U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota, “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota against Eight 
Defendants, Justice Department Announces,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, Minneapolis Division, 
November 23, 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2009/mp112309.htm.  
2 Caroline R. Nagel, “Southern Hospitality? Islamophobia and the Politicization of Refugees in South 
Carolina during the 2016 Election Season,” Southeastern Geographer 56, no. 3 (Fall 2016): 283–90, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/sgo.2016.0033; Thomas Nail, “A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism 
after the Paris Attacks,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 16, no. 1 (April 2016): 158–67, 
https://refugeeresearch.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Nail-2016-The-figure-of-the-migrant.pdf. 
3 Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2018 comp.): 301. 
2 
The Trump administration has sought to overhaul the United States Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP) based on the perceived threat of terrorism within this 
population. The refugee admissions cap for fiscal year 2018 had been set at 45,000, the 
lowest in the history of the program at that time.4 Fiscal year 2019 saw an even further 
reduction in the refugee admissions cap, at a limit of 30,000.5 The following fiscal year, 
2020, saw the greatest reduction by far, with an upper limit of 18,000 refugee admissions.6 
In addition to curtailing the number of admitted refugees, the administration also called for 
“extreme vetting” of those applicants. The Departments of Homeland Security and State 
have been instructed to implement enhanced screening and vetting for all immigration 
benefit applicants, including refugees.7 That same presidential memorandum also 
requested an assessment of the overall cost of USRAP and recommendations to limit  
those costs.8 
A. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The limitations on refugee admissions and the rhetoric emphasizing the threat of 
refugees to the United States has prompted the following questions: Is radicalization of 
resettled refugees a significant threat to the security of the United States? Which factors 
contribute to the violent radicalization of resettled refugees within the United States or in 
other countries? What can be done to mitigate the risk of radicalization from within the 
 
4 Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2018” 
(presidential memorandum to the secretary of state, Washington, DC: White House, 2017), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-state-4/; Oliver Laughland, 
“Donald Trump Caps Refugee Admissions in 2018 Historic Low,” Guardian, September 27, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/27/donald-trump-caps-refugee-admissions-2018-historic-
low. 
5 Presidential Determination No. 2019–01, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,091 (November 1, 2018), https://thefederal
register.org/83-FR/Issue-212/FR-2018-11-01.pdf. 
6 Presidential Determination No. 2020–04, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,903 (November 29, 2019), https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-11-29/pdf/2019-26082.pdf. 
7 Donald J. Trump, “Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening and Vetting of Applications for 
Visas and Other Immigration Benefits, Ensuring Enforcement of All Laws for Entry into the United States, 
and Increasing Transparency among Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government and for the 
American People” (presidential memorandum for the secretary of state, attorney general, and secretary of 




resettled refugee community? To answer these questions, this thesis defines the actual 
scope of the threat to the United States posed by resettled refugees. “Resettled” refugees 
are those admitted to the United States under USRAP and do not include asylees or other 
classes of immigrants or non-immigrants who may reside in the United States.9 It examines 
historical data to find incidents of terrorism perpetrated by resettled refugees in the United 
States. Using this data, it assesses the risk of harm to U.S. persons from this population. It 
also draws from known cases of radicalization among resettled refugees in the United 
States, Canada, and Australia that did not result in domestic terrorist attacks in those 
respective countries. The analysis of these known cases reveals the factors that led these 
populations to radicalize and identifies common trends. 
In assessing whether refugee radicalization is a significant threat to the United 
States, the research may serve to justify further executive action regarding restrictions on 
refugee admissions and increased vetting of admitted refugees. However, if the threat of 
radicalization or terrorism from within the refugee population is not supported by data, the 
need for such actions will be obviated and more appropriate recommendations for policy 
changes to the USRAP can address any risk posed to national security by resettled refugees. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current research on refugee radicalization and the threat of terrorism from refugees 
in the United States consists of a mix of both quantitative and qualitative research. The 
Cato Institute has provided a recent and succinct overview of the last five decades’ major 
quantitative studies on terrorists in the United States.10 Several databases track terrorist 
 
9 Refugees are processed through USRAP, vetted, and approved for travel to and resettlement 
in the United States while still overseas. Asylees apply for and are granted protection and status 
with the U.S. government after entering the United States through a land, air, or sea border. 
Asylum seekers often arrive in the United States as non-immigrants or enter without being 
inspected by immigration authorities. While both refugees and asylees must meet the statutory 
definition of a refugee under the Immigration and Nationality Act in order to be granted status, 
the timing and processes for adjudicating these immigrant statuses are distinct.   
10 Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, Policy Analysis No. 798 
(Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorism-
immigration-risk-analysis#related-content; Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and 
Nationality: A Risk Analysis, 1975-2017, Policy Analysis No. 866 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa_866_edit.pdf. 
4 
attacks across the globe, including RAND’s Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents 
and the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the University of Maryland’s National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Terrorism 
studies experts have used these datasets to assess the number and severity of acts of 
terrorism plotted or perpetrated in the United States since September 11, 2001.11 Such 
comprehensive reviews of the data, especially relating to the immigration status of 
terrorism perpetrators or suspects, are few. 
Leiken and Brooke of the bipartisan Center for National Interest (formerly the 
Nixon Center) note the paucity of quantitative data on terrorism incidents in their 2006 
analysis on terrorism and immigration. While historically comprehensive and useful in 
tracking the overlap between immigration and terrorism, their analysis is now outdated, 
and their dataset is no longer publicly available. Other researchers have built on, and found 
similar results to, Leiken and Brooke’s early studies. Alex Nowrasteh of the Cato Institute, 
whose risk analyses of terrorism and immigration are both recent and data-driven, expands 
upon prior research. He matches known terrorists with their visa categories and tracks the 
methods used by these terrorists to enter the United States. Nowrasteh found that the overall 
risk from foreign-born terrorists in the United States was much lower than that of their 
American-born counterparts. The risk from refugees, specifically, was almost 
infinitesimal. Americans have a “1-in-3.86-billion” chance of dying in a terrorist attack 
perpetrated by a refugee in the United States.12 
Another recent and comprehensive overview of cases of post-9/11 Islamic 
extremist terrorism comes from Nowrasteh’s colleague at the Cato Institute, John 
Mueller.13 Mueller acted as an editor for this compilation, working with the University of 
Columbus to produce this voluminous dataset. The prevalence of the Cato Institute in 
 
11 Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality; Robert Leiken and Steve Brooke, 
“The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 18, no. 4 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550600880294; Jerome P. Bjelopera, American 
Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, CRS Report No. R41416 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2013), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41416/19. 
12 Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality, 1. 
13 John Mueller, ed., Terrorism since 9/11: The American Cases (Columbus: Mershon Center, Ohio 
State University, 2020), https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/SINCE.pdf. 
5 
recent terrorism research does give a slightly myopic perspective, as it emphasizes Islamic 
terrorism. Despite this shortcoming, the products remain objective, as their focus is 
numeric and data-driven, and provide no subjective analysis. 
While Nowrasteh examined the immigration status of convicted or known terrorists 
from a quantitative perspective, Mueller and his team aimed to provide a comprehensive 
case study analysis of a specific subset of terrorist incidents. Mueller’s research looks  
at all cases of Islamic extremist terrorism affecting the United States or its interests since 
9/11 and resulting in investigations, arrests, or convictions.14 In compiling the dataset and 
instructing the analysis, Mueller notes the gaps in prior research on Islamic terrorism 
regarding the “nature of the terrorist ‘adversary.’”15 Mueller found that the motivation for 
most terrorists stemmed from their opposition to American foreign policy, specifically 
regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While many of these terrorists appeared to be 
“misfits,” Mueller’s research does not conclude that isolation, discrimination, or identity 
crises played a significant role in their radicalization.16 These findings seem to contradict 
Sageman’s analysis of terrorism motivations within the diaspora. For his research, 
Sageman points to humiliation and moral outrage as two of the primary drivers toward 
radicalization.17 
As noted by Nowrasteh, no existing dataset on global terrorist incidents includes 
all the demographic information necessary to discern what plots or attacks specifically 
implicate refugees resettled in the United States. Additionally, several datasets exclude 
plots or attacks outside the United States, thereby removing from the data those in the 
United States who have taken action in support of foreign terrorist organizations or traveled 
overseas to participate in terrorism.18 While case studies are useful for analyzing terrorist 
 
14 Mueller. 
15 Mueller, 23. 
16 Mueller. 
17 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 71–88. 
18 Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, 2. 
6 
motivations, the pieces absent from these datasets pose a challenge to fully comprehending 
the scope of the terrorist problem within the refugee community. 
The research analyzing the larger population of homegrown violent jihadists, and 
the refugees found within that set, provides more insight than the raw numbers of refugees 
who have become domestic terrorists.19 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has 
produced a lengthy report on homegrown jihadist terrorism. This report is more 
comprehensive than those from the Cato Institute in that it includes data about U.S. citizens, 
residents, or visitors who became radicalized in the United States but participated in 
terrorism abroad. The CRS estimates that there have been 63 plots or attacks in the United 
States since 9/11 that can be attributed to homegrown radicalization.20 Similar to the 
aforementioned reports, the CRS also limited its data to a single terrorist ideology. It further 
limited its scope to attacks planned or committed within the United States.21 While the 
RAND and START databases include all incidents of terrorism, regardless of ideology, 
research that provides more details regarding those incidents and their perpetrators is 
mostly limited to Islamic terrorists. Such research narrows the world of available data from 
which cases can be drawn for qualitative analysis. 
Outside of quantitative data analysis, research exists on specific subsets within 
refugee communities in different countries who have become radicalized or participated in 
terrorist plots or activity. One much studied group is Somali refugee youth. In the United 
States, Canada, and Australia, members of this diaspora have been known to travel abroad 
to participate in terrorist activity or have attempted to commit terrorist acts domestically.22 
 
19 Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism, 65, 108, 118. 
20 Bjelopera, 1. 
21 Bjelopera, 5. 
22 Scott E. Mulligan, “Radicalization within the Somali-American Diaspora: Countering the 
Homegrown Terrorist Threat” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009) 22, https://calhoun.nps.
edu/handle/10945/4479; Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher, and James Shaheen, Lights, 
Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy (London: International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012), https://preventviolentextremism.info/sites/default/files/Lights,
%20Camera,%20Jihad-%20Al-Shabaab%E2%80%99s%20Western%20Media%20Strategy%20.pdf; 
Michael G. Zekulin, “Islamic-Inspired Home-Grown Terrorism (IIHGT): What We Know and What It 
Means Moving Forward,” Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 8 
(Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2013), http://cdm.ucalgary.ca/index.php/cpmss/
article/view/36353/29308.  
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General research on radicalization and violent extremism does not point to any single factor 
or group of factors that are indicators of radicalization risk. Marc Sageman’s early analysis 
of jihadists found that personal characteristics, such as socioeconomic background, 
education, and national origin, were poor indicators of who might become a terrorist.23 
Subsequent research generally supports this theory—that no specific indicators suggest an 
individual’s likelihood to radicalize.24 However, the most recent wave of jihadi terrorists 
does appear to struggle with identity issues and social struggles.25 
Although resettled refugees do not match the typical immigration status of 
third-wave jihadists, these issues have also been identified as commonalities across 
radicalized members of the Somali diaspora. Weine and his colleagues have dedicated 
several pieces to assessing the various push and pull factors driving members of the Somali 
diaspora to extremism, including identity crises.26 Studies of Somali refugee youth have 
revealed that this identity crisis is particularly acute within that group, exacerbated by their 
isolation from their resettled host communities.27 Studies of the Somali diaspora have the 
benefit of both breadth and depth. Much of this research has spanned the greater part of a 
decade, and several studies have identified individuals, their specific histories, and 
circumstances leading to radicalization. The volume and variety of research make this 
 
23 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 99–135, ProQuest. 
24 Jytte Klausen et al., “Radicalization Trajectories: An Evidence-Based Computational Approach to 
Dynamic Risk Assessment of ‘Homegrown’ Jihadists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 7 (2020): 
588–615, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1492819. 
25 Simon Cottee, “Jihadism as a Subcultural Response to Social Strain: Extending Marc Sageman’s 
‘Bunch of Guys’ Thesis,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (2011): 730–51, https://doi.org/
10.1080/09546553.2011.611840.  
26 Stevan Weine et al., “Community and Family Approaches to Combating the Radicalization and 
Recruitment of Somali-American Youth and Young Adults: A Psychosocial Perspective,” Dynamics of 
Asymmetric Conflict 2, no. 3 (November 2009): 181–200, https://doi.org/10.1080/17467581003586897; 
Stevan Weine, Edna Erez, and Chloe Polutnik, Transnational Crimes among Somali-Americans: 
Convergences of Radicalization and Trafficking (Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, 2019), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/252135.pdf. 
27 Jessica Stern, “Radicalization to Extremism and Mobilization to Violence: What Have We Learned 
and What Can We Do About It?,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, 
(November 2016): 102–17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26361939; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, and 
Shaheen, Lights, Camera, Jihad. 
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community particularly valuable when assessing the risk of radicalization from within a 
population of resettled refugees. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research provides a comprehensive history of refugee laws in the United States 
and an overview of the current refugee admissions program. Using existing research and 
analyses, as well as raw data from global terrorism databases, it assesses the number and 
severity of terrorist plots and attacks perpetrated by resettled refugees within the United 
States. Drawing on qualitative analyses of known terrorist activity within resettled refugee 
communities, including the Twin Cities travelers from the Somali refugee community in 
Minnesota, it compares these cases to analyses of similarly situated cases in Canada and 
Australia from within the Somali and Lebanese diasporas. It focuses on larger groups or 
networks of persons who have become radicalized to commit terrorist acts domestically or 
overseas, rather than lone-wolf terrorists. This research uses existing assessments to 
analyze the shared factors that contributed to the radicalization of those refugees and 
proposes a recommendation for policy actions that could mitigate those risks. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a historical overview of immigration legislation in the United 
States. It details statutes and executive actions taken by the U.S. government with respect 
to refugees. While focusing on domestic law, this chapter also details how international 
law relating to immigrants and refugees helped to shape current legislation in the United 
States and provides a background for how public perception can shape immigration law 
and policy. This chapter also outlines the current process for refugee admissions in the 
United States. Details about the interview, vetting, and travel process are provided to give 
context for analyzing factors that might lead a resettled refugee to become radicalized after 
permanent resettlement. 
Chapter III outlines the known terrorist attacks that have been committed by 
resettled refugees within the United States. The chapter focuses on incidents perpetrated 
by individuals admitted to and resettled in the United States under USRAP; it does not 
include events involving asylees or other classes of immigrants or non-immigrants.  Giving 
9 
details for each of these incidents and perpetrators, this chapter demonstrates the paucity 
of successful attacks that have been committed by resettled refugees on U.S. soil and notes 
that none of these attacks have taken place since the implementation of the current refugee 
admissions process. Providing details about recent unsuccessful terrorist incidents 
attempted by resettled refugees, this chapter demonstrates that various refugee 
communities are implicated in such incidents, though these refugees are more likely to be 
from predominantly Muslim countries. The section also compares known cases of 
radicalized refugees from within the Somali refugee communities in Canada and the United 
States and draws parallel examples from the Somali and Lebanese refugee communities in 
Australia. The Somali refugee communities in North America have been targeted for 
recruitment by al-Shabab, and several factors, including isolationism, contribute to their 
vulnerability to radicalization. Parallels from within the Lebanese refugee community in 
Australia are detailed to demonstrate common themes of risk across different refugee 
populations. 
Chapter IV draws on the risk factors outlined in the previous chapter to provide a 
suggested policy solution for mitigating the risk of refugee radicalization within the United 
States. Drawing on the successes of the Canadian refugee admissions program in 
integrating previous groups of refugees, it suggests a practical step the United States could 
take in expanding its current refugee admissions program to include public and private 
sponsors for individual refugees. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion based on the assessment of the overall risk from 
the U.S. refugee population, as assessed in Chapter II, while acknowledging the known 
examples of, and reasons for, radicalization from within this community. Considering the 
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II. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES:
LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW 
In assessing the scope of any threat posed by refugees, it is important to understand 
the evolution of national legislation pertaining to these immigrants and contextualize 
known terrorist incidents perpetrated by refugees in the proper historical context. U.S. 
refugee law has evolved from reactionary and politically driven bursts of admission or 
exclusion of individuals based on specific criteria to its current state. Since 1980, and until 
very recently, humanitarian need has driven U.S. refugee admissions. While the Trump 
administration significantly curtailed the number of refugee admissions and created 
policies to exclude certain nationalities from admission, the definition of a refugee has 
remained unchanged. USRAP continues to operate in a limited capacity, working closely 
with international partners to interview refugee applicants, conduct robust screening and 
vetting, and accept individuals fleeing persecution from across the globe. 
A. LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”
—Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus”28
28 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” Poetry Foundation, accessed October 26, 2020, https://www.
poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus. 
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A Jewish immigrant penned the famous words inscribed on the base of the Statue 
of Liberty in 1883.29 These words encompass both the history of the United States as a 
country of immigrants and the continuing promise of refuge in a new land. 
1. Regulating Immigration in a New Nation
The history of immigration regulation in the United States is almost as old as the 
country itself. The first pieces of legislation pertaining to the entry of persons to the United 
States were the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. These acts allowed the president to 
remove any foreigner who was deemed dangerous.30 These laws expired after two years, 
and the Alien Act was never enforced.31 The Enemy Alien Act, passed concurrently with 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, authorized the president to remove any citizen, of 14 years of 
age or older, of a country with which the United States was at war.32 Unlike its 
counterparts, the Enemy Alien Act remains good law. 
These pieces of legislation dealt primarily with the expulsion of immigrants from 
the United States, rather than their admission. Tracking of immigrants’ entry into the 
United States did not begin until 1819 under the Steerage Act.33 Prior to this law, an 
estimated 250,000 immigrants had entered the country between 1776 and 1819.34 Even 
this tracking was incomplete, as it required the reporting of passenger manifests only from 
ships coming to Eastern ports. Western ports were not included until 1850, and there was 
no organized tracking of land-border entries until 1910.35 At the time, entry of immigrants 
29 “From Haven to Home: 350 Years of Jewish Life in America,” Library of Congress, accessed 
October 26, 2020, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/haventohome/haven-century.html. 
30 Walter A. Ewing, “Opportunity and Exclusion: A Brief History of US Immigration Policy” 
(Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, 2012), 1–7, https://exchange.americanimmigrationcouncil.
org/sites/default/files/research/opportunity_exclusion_011312.pdf. 
31 David Cole, “Enemy Aliens,” Stanford Law Review 54, no. 5 (May 2002): 989, https://doi.org/10.
2307/1229690. 
32 Cole. 
33 Ewing, “Opportunity and Exclusion,” 2. 
34 Joyce C. Vialet, A Brief History of US Immigration Policy, CRS Report No. 80-223 EPW 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1980), 9, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=15210. 
35 Vialet. 
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was not regulated.36 Manifests were intended to keep Congress and the secretary of state 
continuously updated on the number of immigrants entering the country.37 
In the 1800s, immigration was mostly regulated at the state level. In 1875, the 
Supreme Court in Chy Lung v. Freeman heard a challenge to a California law requiring a 
bond for passengers from “certain enumerated classes” coming to the United States.38 The 
court held that Congress, not individual states, possessed the power to pass laws concerning 
the admission of foreign nationals.39 Stemming partially from this decision and partially 
from waves of European immigrants flowing into the United States, a series of federal laws 
was enacted over the next several decades to regulate immigration.40 
The Page Act of 1875, alternately referred to as the Asian Exclusion Act, barred 
entry of convicts, prostitutes, and forced Chinese laborers.41 In 1882, the Immigration Act 
became the first general immigration statute.42 It based eligibility for entry to the United 
States on national origin.43 Earlier that same year, the Chinese Exclusion Act suspended 
immigration of Chinese labor immigration for 10 years from the date of the act.44 It was 
the first law of its kind to restrict immigrants from a specific ethnic group, and it remained 
in effect until 1943.45 In 1891, the Immigration Act was amended to exclude other classes 
of persons from admission, including the insane, poor, or diseased; polygamists; and a 
variety of criminals.46 Literacy requirements for immigrants were first included in 
 
36 Vialet, 12. 
37 Vialet. 
38 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876). 
39 Chy Lung. 
40 Vialet, A Brief History, 12. 
41 George Peffer, “Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women under the Page 
Law, 1875–1882,” Journal of American Ethnic History 6, no. 1 (1986): 28–46, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/27500484. 
42 Vialet, A Brief History, 12. 
43 Vialet. 
44 Chinese Exclusion Act, Public Law 47–126, U.S. Statutes at Large 22 (1882): 58–59. 
45 Vialet, A Brief History, 12. 
46 Immigration Act of 1891, Public Law 51–551, U.S. Statutes at Large 26 (1891): 1084. 
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legislation in 1897 but were not implemented until congressional overriding of a 
presidential veto in 1917 established a literacy test. That same year, the Immigration Act 
further restricted immigration for peoples from Asia, creating an “Asiatic Barred Zone.”47 
Despite these measures prior to the First World War, immigration to the United 
States continued to grow on an exponential scale. Bills restricting immigration began to 
appear in Congress in 1918 and 1919. The Immigration Act of June 5, 1920, was passed, 
broadly prohibiting the admission of radicals and anarchists.48 Further restrictions on 
immigration were legislated through the use of quotas. The Quota Act of 1921 applied 
numerical limitations to immigration, regardless of eligibility. This law marked the onset 
of a bifurcated immigrant admission system based on selection and restriction.49 The quota 
system was modified through the Quota Act of 1924. In 1928, a national origins quota was 
implemented to reduce the overall amount of immigration and “maintain the cultural and 
racial homogeneity of the United States.”50 These quotas were based on the population of 
the United States as recorded in the 1890 census. 
From 1890 until the Second World War, little immigration legislation was passed 
in the United States. With the advent of the war in 1939, the United States became more 
fearful of enemy aliens. This anxiety was reflected in the Alien Registration Act of 1940. 
That act created five additional categories of removable aliens, and aliens who were over 
the age of 14 and present in the United States for 30 days or more were required to be 
registered and fingerprinted.51 The quota system and other isolationist policies caused the 
1930s to see the slowest immigration flow in a century.52 The next years, and the 
widespread persecution carried out during the Second World War, led to a shift in 
 
47 Edward P. Hutchinson, “Immigration Policy since World War I,” Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 262, no. 1 (March 1949): 18, https://doi.org/10.1177/000271624926200103. 
48 Hutchinson, 15–21. 
49 Hutchinson, 16. 
50 Hutchinson, 17. 
51 Hutchinson, 19. 
52 Vialet, A Brief History, 21–22. 
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ideologies in the U.S. approach to immigration. The legislation passed in the war’s 
aftermath would form the foundation of refugee admissions to the United States.53 
2. From Exclusion to Admission: The Development of Refugee Legislation 
Under the enduring quota system, there was no provision to address the admission 
of refugees to the United States. They were virtually barred from entry. Prior to 1942, the 
United States had taken in only 250,000 refugees from Nazi persecution.54 An estimated 
11 million persons were displaced within Europe after the war, yet the United States only 
accepted roughly 400,000.55 The refugee problem at the time was seen as singular. The 
government did not think it would need a legislative solution.56 Due to the failure of 
Congress to take precedential or permanent action on refugees, the executive branch was 
forced to act outside of statutory immigration limits.57 
To alleviate quotas on refugee admissions, President Truman passed a directive 
permitting up to 90 percent of regular quotas for Central and Eastern Europe to be used for 
displaced persons.58 Roughly 42,000 were admitted under this directive in 1945.59 A 
legislative solution proposed to overcome the quota system had failed.60 Though it did not 
result in a large number of admissions, Truman’s directive was transformative in allowing 
for humanitarian agencies to sponsor refugees in lieu of “financially competent 
 
53 Vialet, 19. 
54 Philip A. Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States,” in Refugees in America in the 
1990s: A Reference Handbook, ed. David W. Haines (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 5. 
55 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States”; Anastasia Brown and Todd Scribner, 
“Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The Refugee Resettlement System in the United States,” 
Journal on Migration and Human Security 2, no. 2 (2014): 101–20, https://doi.org/10.14240/jmhs.v2i2.2. 
56 Linda W. Gordon, “The Origins and Initial Resettlement Patterns of Refugees in the United States,” 
in Refugees in America in the 1990s: A Reference Handbook, ed. David W. Haines (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1996), 331–54. 
57 Deborah Anker and Michael Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee 
Act of 1980,” San Diego Law Review 19, no. 1 (1981): 13, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/
sanlr19&i=17. 
58 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States,” 5. 
59 Holman. 
60 Gordon, “The Origins and Initial Resettlement Patterns of Refugees,” 335. 
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individuals.”61 The directive allowed for the agencies themselves to pay for resettlement 
costs for displaced persons instead of using tax dollars.62 
Since the directive and the existing legislation did not distinguish between refugees 
and other immigrants, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. This 
emergency legislation, passed due to pressure from the executive branch, allowed for a 
narrowly defined group of 202,000 displaced persons to be admitted to the United States 
over a two-year period.63 Overall, more than 400,000 displaced persons were admitted 
between 1948 and 1951.64 It was also under this act that a national network for refugee 
resettlement began to develop. Humanitarian agencies ceded responsibility for travel costs 
to the federal government and took over responsibility for the resettlement process.65 
The approach to refugees continued to be driven by ad hoc executive and legislative 
responses for the next two decades, despite the Displaced Persons Act.66 The more 
comprehensive Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 also failed to provide a 
solution to the refugee problem. It focused on national origins quotas and family 
reunification.67 The Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and its subsequent amendments, was 
narrowly tailored to allow for the admission of only European refugees and those escaping 
communist countries.68 To respond to the 1956 Hungarian refugee crisis, the attorney 
general employed the INA’s parole provision to admit 15,000 Hungarian refugees who 
were ineligible for visas under the expired Refugee Relief Act, which permitted that only 
6,500 visas be issued.69 The statutory intent of parole was to use the attorney general’s 
 
61 Brown and Scribner, “Unfulfilled Promises,” 104. 
62 Brown and Scribner.  
63 Brown and Scribner, “Unfulfilled Promises”; Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 13. 
64 Vialet, A Brief History, 19. 
65 Brown and Scribner, “Unfulfilled Promises,” 104. 
66 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 13. 
67 Vialet, A Brief History, 21. 
68 Vialet, 22. 
69 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 15; Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Public Law 83–203, 
U.S. Statutes at Large 67 (1953): 400, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-67/pdf/STATUTE-67-
Pg400.pdf. 
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discretionary authority to allow aliens to enter the United States temporarily due to an 
emergency or for the public interest; such entry is not considered a lawful admission, and 
aliens are supposed to return to their countries of origin after the period authorized for 
parole has expired.70 Without the use of parole here, it would have taken three years’ worth 
of quotas to admit this number of Hungarian refugees. 
The Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957 expanded the class of refugees previously 
articulated in the Refugee Relief Act to include those fleeing from the Middle East.71 This 
law was still insufficient to capture all refugees in need of assistance. In 1958, the Azores 
and Netherlands Refugee Act was passed to assist Portuguese nationals displaced by 
earthquakes and Dutch nationals displaced by floods in Indonesia.72 This law was the  
first instance of offering refuge to foreign nationals fleeing from natural disasters. 
Provisions for similarly situated populations would be included in future refugee 
legislation. In 1959, the Refugee Relatives Act provided for family members of individuals 
who had been admitted under the prior Refugee Relief Act to obtain admission as  
non-quota immigrants.73 
The United Nations declared 1960 the Year of the Refugee, and the issue of 
refugees came to the international foreground.74 In the hopes of aiding the closure of 
European refugee camps, the Fair Share Law of 1960 allowed for the attorney general to 
use parole authority to admit a “fair share” of refugees in those camps. Twenty-five percent 
of remaining European refugees were admitted to the United States under this law.75 This 
act, like ones before it, was narrowly tailored to include only certain populations of 
 
70 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 15. 
71 Vialet, A Brief History, 23. 
72 Gordon, “The Origins and Initial Resettlement Patterns of Refugees,” 337. 
73 Gordon.  
74 Gordon, 338. 
75 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 16; Vialet, A Brief History, 23–24. 
18 
refugees.76 From 1960 through 1962, the widespread use of parole authority by the 
executive branch filled gaps in congressional legislation aimed at refugees.77 
Beginning in 1960, the United States was host for the first time to a population of 
refugees from the Western Hemisphere. The fall of Cuba’s Batista government sent waves 
of refugees from the island.78 In 1960 alone, over 100,000 Cuban refugees reached the 
United States. This influx of immigrants prompted President Eisenhower to establish the 
Cuban Refugee Center in Miami, Florida, with a $1 million allocation of funds from the 
President’s Contingency Fund.79 An additional $4 million was allocated in 1961 to 
continue supporting the ongoing flow of Cuban refugees.80 This program was the first  
and only to provide assistance to refugees arriving in the United States as the country of 
first refuge.81 
President Eisenhower issued a directive in May 1962 to address the “Hong Kong 
Chinese.”82 Like previous directives, this was a temporary fix to a singular crisis. Chinese 
persons fleeing the mainland to Hong Kong who were relatives of U.S. citizens or residents, 
were special skills aliens, or had previously denied refugee applications due to visa limits 
were allowed admission.83 
With ongoing refugee crises, the United States was driven to pass more 
comprehensive legislation. The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 provided 
the first broad definition of refugee. It included persons from the Western Hemisphere who 
fled, or could not return to their countries of origin, because of persecution based on race, 
 
76 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 16. 
77 Anker and Posner.  
78 John F. Thomas, “Cuban Refugees in the United States,” International Migration Review 1, no. 2 
(1967): 46–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/3002808. 
79 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States,” 7; Thomas, “Cuban Refugees in the United 
States,” 47. 
80 Thomas, “Cuban Refugees in the United States,” 48. 
81 Holman, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States,” 7–8; Gordon, “The Origins and Initial 
Resettlement Patterns of Refugees,” 341. 
82 Gordon, “The Origins and Initial Resettlement Patterns of Refugees,” 339. 
83 Gordon.  
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religion, or political opinion.84 The act created a better system of cooperation between the 
federal government and international refugee assistance groups as well as better funding 
for refugee programs, including the existing Cuban Refugee Program.85 
For more than two decades, the United States failed to establish comprehensive or 
lasting refugee legislation. This deficit in legislation resulted in special treatment for certain 
ethnic populations and created a constant need for executive or congressional action to 
respond to the crises as they arose. In 1965, Congress passed amendments to the INA that 
established a permanent legal basis for refugee admission to the United States.86 These 
amendments repealed all previous refugee laws, including the national origin quotas, and 
set the yearly limit at just over 10,000 admissions.87 While codifying refugee admissions, 
these amendments represented a regression in refugee policy. The definition limited 
refugees to those fleeing persecution from a communist country or the Middle East.  
The amendments did, however, contain a provision for admitting refugees fleeing  
natural disasters.88 
Even these legislative amendments did not adequately address the issue of refugee 
admissions. The attorney general continued to employ parole authority to admit scores of 
refugees to evade the numerical limitations in the INA.89 Cubans, in particular, continued 
to benefit from the executive’s supplemental refugee admissions. More than 265,000 
Cuban refugees were air-lifted into the United States, at the rate of 3,000–4,000 per month  
 
 
84 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 17; Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, 
Public Law No. 87–510, U.S. Statutes at Large 76 (1962): 121 http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/87/
510.pdf. 
85 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 17; Thomas, “Cuban Refugees in the United States,” 48. 
86 Anker and Posner, “The Forty Year Crisis,” 17. 
87 Gordon, “The Origins and Initial Resettlement Patterns of Refugees,” 340; Holman, “Refugee 
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between 1965 and 1973, based on a memorandum of understanding between President 
Johnson and Cuba.90 
The 1965 INA amendments did not prevent further legislation directed at specific 
refugee populations. Although in 1968 the U.S. Senate ratified the 1967 United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of a Refugee, it did not formally adopt the apolitical refugee 
definition from that protocol at the time.91 The United States continued to cater to different 
refugee groups “deserving of special consideration.”92 In 1971, the attorney general used 
his authority to allow for Jewish persons from the USSR to enter the United States as 
refugees.93 The same authority was exercised in 1972 for expelled Ugandan Asians.94 
Similar programs targeting Romanians, Eastern Europeans, Lebanese, and South American 
political prisoners were used throughout the 1970s.95 
President Ford’s 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act provided 
Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees with the same access to domestic assistance as did 
the similarly named act of 1962 for Cubans.96 Approximately 130,000 Vietnamese 
refugees resettled in the United States within seven months of its signing.97 Over 250,000 
additional Southeast Asian refugees were resettled under this act in the three subsequent 
fiscal years.98 During this time, Congress continued to amend the INA to create 
consistency in refugee policy.99 The 1976 amendments extended the per-country refugee 
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limit to 20,000 but maintained a preference for refugees from the Western Hemisphere.100 
The 1979 amendments developed a single preference system with a worldwide ceiling of 
290,000.101 
Despite the consistent updating of the INA after its passage in 1965, legislation 
pertaining to refugees did not create a cohesive policy until the Refugee Act of 1980. This 
act established refugees as their own class of immigrant, eliminating them as a category in 
the preference system and acknowledging that refugee resettlement was not a singular 
phenomenon.102 It formally adopted the definition of a refugee from the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in U.S. law and provided for regular 
admission of refugees in consultation with Congress.103 
Before the passage of the Refugee Act, refugees were defined in U.S. law as 
“persons fleeing persecution in Communist countries or countries in the Middle East.”104 
Beginning in 1980, the U.S. defined a refugee as any person, outside of one’s country of 
nationality or last place of residence, “who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”105 This 
shift aligned the U.S. refugee policy with the posture of the international community and 
shied away from preferential treatment for certain types of political refugees. There has 
been no cohesive legislative update pertaining to refugees since the passage of this act. The 
legal posture under which the United States processes and admits refugees has remained 
unchanged for the past 40 years. 
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B. THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM: AN 
OVERVIEW 
To offer resettlement opportunities to persons overseas who are of special 
humanitarian concern, while protecting national security and combating 
fraud. 
 —Mission of the United States Refugee Admissions Program106 
Refugee admissions fall under the purview of the executive branch of the U.S. 
government. Each year, the Department of State (DOS) submits a report to Congress on 
behalf of the president proposing a number of refugee admissions for that year.107 This 
report, compiled with the assistance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
analyzes the global refugee situation and the United States’ ability to participate in 
resettling refugees; it also assesses whether the admission of refugees comports with the 
national interests of the country or is otherwise justified by humanitarian concerns.108 This 
report forms the basis for consultations with Congress that yield a presidential declaration 
setting a ceiling for refugee admissions each fiscal year.109 
USRAP is operated by DOS in conjunction with DHS and the Department of Health 
and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).110 Refugees are 
referred for application and processing by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) or a trained non-governmental organization (NGO).111 Refugees must 
generally be outside of the United States and fall into one of three priorities for application 
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to USRAP. Priority one refugees must be referred to the United States by UNHCR  
or a specially trained NGO as individuals with “compelling persecution needs or those  
for whom no other durable solution exists.”112 Refugees falling under priority two  
include those of “special concern” selected by DOS with input from UNHCR, the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and certain NGOs.113 Priority three 
refugees are the parents, spouses, and unmarried children of refugees who have already 
resettled in the United States and for whom an affidavit of relationship has been filed  
with DHS.114 
After referral, the first step in the refugee admissions process is handled by one of 
seven Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) around the globe. These RSCs are managed 
and funded by DOS but operated by NGOs, international organizations, or contract 
employees of a U.S. embassy.115 At the RSC, applicants are prepared for screening through 
the collection of biometric and biographic data and the initiation of security checks.116 
Applicants are also prepared for interview and adjudication before USCIS. The RSC 
creates a case file, which includes biographic and claim information collected by UNHCR, 
and prepares the I-590 Registration for Classification as a Refugee and case summary.117 
Applicants are also educated about the refugee application and admission process.118 
Once the RSC prepares an applicant’s case, it is referred to USCIS for an in-person 
interview with a refugee officer.119 Refugee officers are specially trained to conduct 
non-adversarial interviews about an applicant’s refugee claim and eligibility for admission 
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to the United States.120 Refugee interviews are designed to elicit credible testimony 
regarding an applicant’s qualifications for refugee status, including whether the applicant 
has been appropriately referred under a processing priority, whether the applicant meets 
the statutory definition of a refugee, whether the applicant has been firmly resettled 
(offered or granted citizenship) in a third country, and whether the applicant is otherwise 
inadmissible to the United States.121 
USCIS is also responsible for completing and analyzing the results of security 
checks to assess any potential derogatory information that may prevent the approval of a 
refugee application.122 This part of the process involves checking multiple security 
systems owned by various U.S. agencies for each applicant.123 The DOS Consular 
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) vets primary names and aliases of applicants before 
the USCIS interview, and USCIS reviews and resolves any potential mismatches.124 Any 
additional biographic data collected at the interview is also run through CLASS before the 
final decision on the case.125 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and intelligence 
community partners conduct biographic checks called security advisory opinions 
(SAOs).126 The RSC initiates these checks, which are reviewed and cleared by USCIS 
before the interview. As with the CLASS check, any new biographic data acquired at the 
time of the interview generates a new SAO, which must be reviewed and cleared prior to a 
final decision. 
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The FBI also conducts recurring checks for criminal history and other immigration 
data based on a refugee applicant’s fingerprints, as it does for many other immigration form 
types. Intelligence community partners, including the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), are responsible for providing results of an interagency check, which vets an 
applicant’s biographic data on a recurring basis. These checks are initiated by USCIS, 
typically at the time of interview.127 For applicants from certain regions, biometrics are 
run against the Department of Defense (DoD)’s Forensics and Biometrics Automated 
Biometric Identification System. This system is only available if the DoD has had sufficient 
military presence in an area to collect biometric data.128 In addition to these standard 
security checks, USCIS’s Fraud Detection and Nationality Security (FDNS) officers route 
certain cases with nationality security concerns through the enhanced Controlled 
Application Review and Resolution Process and conduct enhanced FDNS reviews for 
certain populations of cases. Approved refugees are vetted by Customs and Border 
Protection before departure and are then inspected for admission at a port of entry upon 
arrival in the United States.129 
After interview and adjudication by USCIS, applicants whose I-590s have been 
conditionally approved go through post-adjudication with the RSC.130 All refugees 
undergo either a health screening by a panel physician or a physical exam with the 
International Office of Migration (IOM)’s Health Division.131 The purpose of this health 
screening is to assess an individual’s physical and mental fitness to travel and ensure any 
necessary treatments or vaccines are delivered.132 Refugees who are cleared to travel 
usually receive a cultural orientation from the RSC, which lasts one to five days.133 This 
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orientation covers topics such as housing, transportation, employment, English language 
skills, education, health and hygiene, budgeting and finance, and immigration law.134 
DOS funds refugee travel with a no-interest loan, which refugees pay back to DOS 
beginning six months after their arrival to the United States.135 IOM is responsible for the 
administration of these loans, which must be repaid within 46 months of resettlement, 
either to IOM or to an authorized loan-collecting resettlement agency.136 
Each refugee is paired with a sponsoring resettlement agency in the United States 
that coordinates the resettlement site and provides support services.137 Sponsoring 
agencies receive grants from DOS aimed to help refugees pay their expenses for the first 
90 days in the United States. Any supplemental funds or resources are provided by the 
agency itself.138 The goal of resettlement agencies is to assist refugees with their 
adjustment to living in the United States by providing services to address integration, 
education, employment, immigration case management, and language support.139 
USCIS, in an attempt to assist with the full assimilation of refugees up to and 
through the naturalization process, supplements ORR’s programs, promoting self-
sufficiency through the funding of the Refugee and Asylee Assimilation Program.140 The 
program funds eligible local organizations to assist with developing assimilation plans 
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geared toward cultivating responsible citizens who feel a sense of belonging and 
attachment to the United States. To be eligible, the organizations must be familiar with 
asylee and refugee populations in their areas.141 Funding in this fiscal year is available for 
only six organizations nationwide, limiting the scope of access to such services by the 
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III. RADICALIZED REFUGEES: PERPETRATORS 
AND TRAVELERS 
Resettled refugees have attempted or carried out over 20 terrorist attacks in the 
United States. However, only a very small number of these attacks have been successful or 
resulted in death or injury to U.S. persons. Notably, no fatal attacks have occurred since 
the implementation of the current refugee admissions process as established under the 1980 
Refugee Act. Recent terrorist incidents have been attempted or perpetrated by resettled 
refugees from a range of refugee communities. The Somali refugee population in North 
America has been most susceptible to radicalization; there have been known cases of 
relatively large numbers of radicalized Somali refugees in both Canada and the United 
States. Several psychosocial factors, most notably isolationism, have contributed to these 
communities’ vulnerability to radicalization. 
A. REFUGEE RADICALIZATION—A PERCEIVED OR ACTUAL THREAT? 
Refugees are not terrorists. Refugees are many times the first victims of 
terror. 
 —Antonio Guterres, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees143 
There are a number of known terrorist attacks that have been committed by resettled 
refugees within the United States over the course of the last 50 years. While recent rhetoric 
surrounding refugees and terrorism would imply a significant risk to the life and safety of 
U.S. citizens, the data available indicates that there is no pattern of domestic terrorist 
activity within the refugee community. In analyzing the details of each of these incidents 
and their perpetrators, it is evident there have been few fatal attacks in recent history, and 
there is no single root cause of these attacks. No fatal attacks have occurred since the 
implementation of the current refugee admissions law and process under the Refugee Act 
of 1980, making the actual risk posed by resettled refugees a minimal one. 
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1. Refugee Attacks in the United States: The Numbers 
Between 1975 and 2017, a total of 25 individuals resettled in the United States as 
refugees were responsible for terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.144 This number equates with 
about 13 percent of total foreign-born terrorists identified in the United States during that 
timeframe.145 In total, 192 foreign-born terrorists were responsible for the killings of 3,037 
people, the majority of whom perished in the attacks on September 11, 2001.146 No one 
involved in the attacks of 9/11 had entered the United States as a refugee.147 Based on the 
raw data, this puts the risk of being killed by a refugee in a terrorist attack in the United 
States at 0.000000026 percent—functionally, zero.148 An individual’s status as a refugee 
is not an indicator of potential for terrorist activity.149 Parallel studies have found that 
immigration, particularly refugee protection programs, generally reduce the number of 
attacks by acting to diffuse terrorism on a global scale.150 
There has not been another metadata analysis conducted for terrorist attacks after 
2017 in the United States. However, the Global Terrorism Database serves as a repository 
for all terrorist incidents worldwide from 1970 through 2018. Queries of this database 
reveal that there was one additional incident of domestic terrorism perpetrated by a refugee 
in the United States between 2017 and 2018.151 That attack did not result in any deaths. 
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Through 2017, the 25 refugees responsible for a handful of terrorist attacks were 
successful in only three, killing three people.152 Those attacks were all committed by 
Cuban refugees in the 1970s. All of these individuals were admitted to the United States 
before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. They were not subject to the progressively 
enhanced screening and vetting implemented by DHS and its partner agencies.153 While 
the last decade has seen another three successful attacks by three additional 
refugees-turned-terrorists, none of those resulted in casualties.154 The most common 
perpetrators of terrorism within the United States are native-born or naturalized citizens.155 
2. Lethal Refugee Attacks in the United States 
There were two lethal attacks by refugees in the United States between 1975 and 
2015. Valentin Hernandez, a Cuban refugee, participated in a terrorist campaign in Florida 
in the mid-1970s. He was responsible for gunning down fellow Cuban refugee and activist 
Luciano Nieves on February 21, 1975.156 Hernandez had a history of violence against 
Nieves due to the latter’s desire to re-establish ties between Cuba and the United States. At 
the time of the investigation and trial, Miami police determined that Cuban politics was the 
cause of the terrorism.157 Alvin Ross Diaz, a Cuban national and director of the Cuban 
Nationalist Movement, provided assistance to Cuban national and U.S. lawful permanent 
resident Guillermo Novo Sampol in the September 21, 1976, assassinations of Chilean 
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Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and his American assistant, Ronni Moffit. The two were 
killed in Washington, DC, at the direction of Pinochet’s junta.158 
These three deaths comprise the only fatal terrorist attacks by resettled refugees in 
the United States in the last four decades. All three involved Christian, North American 
refugees admitted before adoption of modern refugee law, and before the cohesive and 
extensive vetting of refugee applicants by various U.S. government entities. 
3. Recent Terrorist Activity Related to Refugees 
Between 1986 and 2003, there were no terrorist attacks on U.S. soil by refugees.159 
Between 2004 and 2017, 14 refugees were implicated in terrorist plots, or engaged in 
terrorist activity, in the United States.160 One other refugee was connected to a terrorist 
attack between 2017 and 2018.161 The ideology of terrorists in the United States between 
1986 and the early 2000s shifted from predominantly political to religious. The majority of 
recently identified terrorist plots in the United States have been linked to known Islamic 
terrorist groups or to extremist Islamic ideology.162 
In 2004, an Iraqi Kurdistan refugee named Yassin Aref conspired to aid a Pakistani 
terrorist group by providing support for a weapon of mass destruction and money 
laundering.163 Aref was an imam in Albany, New York, and was suspected of being 
connected to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group based on evidence discovered in a 
successful raid in Iraq.164 
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Agron Abdullahu was the sole refugee implicated with five other men in a terrorist 
plot to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey, in 2007.165 Abdullahu, a refugee from Kosovo-
Albania, was charged with allowing others in the plot, including several illegal immigrants, 
to possess and use guns he owned legally. The plot was meant to kill military personnel at 
the Army base and had no affiliation with a known terrorist organization.166 
New York City, a recurring target of terrorist plots in the aftermath of 9/11, was 
home to resettled Afghan refugee Najibullah Zazi, who admitted to plotting a coordinated 
attack on the subways there in 2009.167 Not only was Zazi’s plot operated on behalf of 
al-Qaida; he also fought with the Taliban against the United States in Pakistan in 2008 and 
received training as a bomb maker.168 Zazi’s co-conspirators, Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis 
Medunjanin, were also refugees.169 
On July 27, 2009, Hysen Sherifi, a Kosovar refugee, was arrested with six others 
in North Carolina on charges of plotting jihad abroad.170 Sherifi, who traveled back to 
Kosovo, translated recruitment videos and collected money in the United States for 
carrying out jihad in Kosovo.171 With his co-conspirators, Sherifi plotted to attack military 
personnel at the Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia.172 They were convicted of 
conspiracy and possession of weapons.173 
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Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested in Portland, Oregon, on November 26, 
2010, for attempting to bomb a Christmas tree-lighting event.174 Mohamud, a native of 
Somalia, had resettled in the United States at the age of five.175 During his teenage years, 
Mohamud became radicalized online and inspired by other jihadists, including the 
perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks in 2008.176 Mohamud’s father reported his son to the 
FBI, indicating that he feared he had been brainwashed by associates in Yemen. This tip 
thwarted Mohamud’s two attempts to travel abroad to fight with al-Qaida, so the young 
man began planning an attack in Portland.177 Due to the FBI’s involvement, the bombing 
plot was unsuccessful.178 
January 2012 saw a trio of foiled terrorist attacks by refugees. Uzbek refugee 
Jamshid Muhtorov was arrested in Aurora, Colorado, for plans to travel abroad to fight 
with the Pakistani-based Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). He had also collected funds from at 
least one other individual to provide to the IJU.179 Kosovar refugee Sami Osmakac was 
implicated in January 2012 in a plot to bomb several public targets near Tampa, Florida. 
Osmakac expressed extremist views and support of al-Qaida and had been expelled from a 
local mosque.180 Iraqi refugee Abdullatif Ali Aldosary was indicted in 2012 in the 
bombing of a Social Security office in Casa Grande, Arizona.181 
Uzbek refugee Fazliddin Kurbanov was arrested in May 2013 in Boise, Idaho, for 
conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist organization, the Islamic Movement of 
 
174 Charles A. Eby, “The Nation That Cried Lone Wolf: A Data-Driven Analysis of Individual 
Terrorists in the United States since 9/11” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 83–84, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA560635.pdf. 
175 Brad Knickerbocker, “Mohamed Osman Mohamud: The Somali Teen Who Wanted to Bomb 
Portland,” Christian Science Monitor, November 28, 2010, ProQuest. 
176 Jytte Klausen et al., “Toward a Behavioral Model of ‘Homegrown’ Radicalization Trajectories,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 1 (2015): 67–83, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1099995. 
177 Klausen et al., 76–77. 
178 Klausen et al. 
179 Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism, 65–66. 
180 Bjelopera, 66. 
181 “Congressman Gosar Addresses Bombing in His District,” Official Website of Congressman Paul 
Gosar, December 3, 2012, https://gosar.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1450. 
35 
Uzbekistan (IMU).182 Kurbanov communicated with members of the IMU for nearly a 
year and discussed building a bomb to perpetrate an attack in the United States. When the 
FBI searched his home in 2012 and 2013, they discovered components for bomb-making. 
Kurbanov had also provided instructions and demonstrations on bomb-making in January 
2013, for which he was indicted in Utah.183 
Two Cuban-born Floridians, Harlem Suarez and Miguel Moran Diaz, were arrested 
in 2015 for separate attempted attacks inspired by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).184 Diaz came to the attention of the FBI because of his pro-ISIS Facebook activity 
and was arrested on April 2, 2015.185 In several meetings with an undercover informant, 
Diaz expressed a desire to acquire ammunition, in addition to what he already possessed, 
to perpetrate a sniper attack in Miami.186 Diaz described himself as a “‘lone wolf’ for 
ISIS.”187 Suarez was arrested on July 27, 2015, in Key West, Florida.188 He was charged 
with “attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction” and had also come to the attention 
of the FBI because of his pro-ISIS Facebook activity, including a request for bomb-making 
instructions.189 
Somali refugee Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud was arrested in April 2015 in 
Columbus, Ohio, for providing and attempting to provide material support to al-Nusra 
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Front in Syria.190 Mohamud’s brother had also traveled to Syria and was killed while 
fighting with al-Nusra; after his brother’s death, Mohamud returned to the United States 
where he plotted to attack military personnel, uniformed officers, and government 
employees.191 Mohamud intended to attack a federal medical center in Texas and pleaded 
guilty to all counts brought against him.192 
The next terrorist incident in the United States perpetrated by a refugee was not 
until September 2016 when Somali refugee Dahir Adan perpetrated a mass stabbing in a 
mall in St. Cloud, Minnesota.193 In total, 10 people were injured in the attack.194 Although 
Adan had no affiliation with any terrorist organization, the Islamic State later claimed 
responsibility for his actions.195 
Most recently, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed attempted to run down two men outside 
a synagogue in California in November 2018.196 Mohamed, a Somali refugee, had no 
known terrorist affiliations and a history of mental illness.197 
4. The Real Risk 
The history of terrorist attacks in the United States perpetrated by refugees is 
lengthy, spanning the course of five decades. However, over that entire span of time, there 
 
190 “Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” Department of Justice, June 
29, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-man-pleads-guilty-providing-material-support-terrorists. 
191 Department of Justice. 
192 Andrew Welsh-Huggins, “Man Apologizes, Sentenced to 22 Years for US Terrorism Plot,” Seattle 
Times, January 21, 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/ohio-man-accused-of-plotting-us-
attacks-to-be-sentenced/. 
193 Nowrasteh, Terrorists by Immigration Status and Nationality, 21; Abigail Hauslohner and Drew 
Harwell, “An Unassuming Life before a Suspect’s Rampage in a Minnesota Mall,” Washington Post, 
September 19, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/an-unassuming-life-before-a-
suspects-rampage-in-a-minnesota-mall/2016/09/19/f2a608f0-7e7a-11e6-9070-5c4905bf40dc_story.html. 
194 Hauslohner and Harwell, “An Unassuming Life.” 
195 Mitch Smith, “Unanswered Questions Fuel Doubts among Friends of Minnesota Mall Attacker,” 
New York Times, September 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/unanswered-questions-
fuel-doubts-among-friends-of-minnesota-mall-attacker.html. 
196 James Queally, “Seattle Man Will Face Attempted Murder Charges in L.A. Synagogue Attack,” Los 
Angeles Times, February 1, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-mohamed-abdi-
synagogue-attack-20190131-story.html. 
197 Queally.  
37 
have been relatively few documented terrorist incidents, and only three lives have been 
claimed by these attacks. The posture of the Trump administration has fed the public 
perception that refugees pose a significant threat to the life and safety of citizens of the 
United States. The data available, however, indicates that the risk of harm by refugees is 
so low that it is considered statistically insignificant. 
B. RADICALIZED REFUGEES ACROSS CONTINENTS: SOMALI 
JIHADISTS FROM THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA 
Barasho horteed ha I nicin. (Get to know me, before you reject me.) 
 —Somali proverb198 
While radicalized refugees rarely pose a significant threat to the U.S. homeland, 
pockets of refugees have fallen victim to radicalization efforts over the last several decades. 
This pattern has been observed both in the United States and in other countries. While these 
efforts have not resulted in any attacks or deaths within the United States, that does not 
discount the existence of the risk of refugees’ becoming radicalized after resettlement—or 
the need to understand and mitigate that risk. Members of the Somali diaspora in the United 
States and Canada share many of the same experiences and struggles, and both suffer from 
identity issues and isolationism. These psychosocial challenges have made many Somali 
youth susceptible to radicalization. The Lebanese diaspora in Australia had a similar 
experience to that of North American Somali refugees and were radicalized to terrorist 
activity in significant numbers. All three communities share the experience of living in 
insulated communities within their host countries and being relatively disadvantaged 
compared to other refugees. 
1. United States: The Somali Travelers 
Beginning in the 1970s, Somalia was plagued by internal and external conflicts 
including tribalism, wars with neighboring states, state collapse, and a fight to establish it 
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as an Islamic state.199 The constant turmoil in Somalia for the last five decades has led to 
the killing of hundreds of thousands of Somalis and the flight of hundreds of thousands 
more.200 Nearly two million Somalis have been internally displaced or made refugees 
since the 1990s, with thousands fleeing through the last decade.201 The United States has 
become home to a large subset of this refugee population. According to DHS’s Yearbooks 
of Immigration Statistics, the United States has admitted over 142,000 Somali refugees 
since 1993.202 Until 2018, Somalis comprised 10–13 percent of all refugees admitted to 
the United States each fiscal year, even spiking as high as 25 percent in 2004.203 
As of 2009, there were a reported 60,000 Somali refugees living in Minnesota, the 
majority of whom settled in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area. A subset of this area came to 
be known as “Little Mogadishu.”204 The Little Mogadishu community mirrors Somali 
culture in many ways, as its geographical isolation does not allow for integration of its 
population into the local culture or access to local services.205 Such isolation has left the 
community open to internal and external forces that seek to radicalize and reconnect its 
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youth with Somalia and with the Somali-based terrorist organization al-Shabab.206 This 
community of resettled refugees was home to the first known American terrorists who were 
recruited to return to Somalia, receive training, and fight alongside members of 
al-Shabab.207 
Al-Shabab sees itself as an “all-Somali” movement and draws on Somalis’ 
nationalism to gain support.208 Despite its nationalistic roots, al-Shabab has not remained 
insulated within Somalia. It infiltrates neighboring countries and claims responsibility for 
terrorist attacks in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. It also aligns itself against American 
interests and with al-Qaida.209 The reach of al-Shabab has extended outside the African 
continent with attacks, or attempted attacks, in Australia, Sweden, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.210 Particularly within refugee communities in Europe and 
the United States, al-Shabab has developed a recruitment foothold by drawing on the 
feelings of nationalistic pride and religious devotion to lure disenfranchised refugees back 
to their homelands.211 A network of recruiters and fundraisers operating on behalf of top 
leaders within al-Shabab has fed on the isolation of Somali refugee communities in the 
United States and Canada.212 
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Between 2007 and 2008, 18 Somali-American youths left the United States to 
return to Somalia and join al-Shabab.213 In October 2008, one of these young men, Shirwa 
Ahmed, would become the first known American jihadist suicide bomber.214 Subsequent 
FBI investigations would reveal that Ahmed and his cohorts had been recruited by 
al-Shabab while still in Minnesota.215 Fourteen people were implicated in the case, which 
became “the most significant domestic terrorism investigation since Sept. 11.”216 Between 
2009 and 2012, an additional five young Somali-American males joined their numbers in 
fighting for al-Shabab, bringing the total number of known travelers to 23.217 At least 40 
Americans are known to have joined al-Shabab, making the United States the primary 
exporter of Western fighters in Somalia and accounting for the most significant trend in 
homegrown terrorism since 9/11.218 The majority of these young men had come to the 
United States as refugee children, victims of the diaspora. 
2. The Culture Gap: Fodder for Radicalization 
Similar to the study of homegrown terrorists, researchers analyzing diasporic 
communities must focus on the process of radicalization, as it happens after resettlement; 
these individuals align more closely with homegrown rather than foreign terrorists.219 
Those researchers who have studied the Somali refugee population in the United States, 
specifically the aforementioned travelers, have found several factors that make these young 
males vulnerable to radicalization: financial hardship, a generational gap and lack of 
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familial support, coming-of-age issues, identity crises, mental health issues, insulation, a 
lack of opportunities, and gang involvement.220 
Financial hardship and a lack of opportunity are two factors that make this 
population especially susceptible to radicalization.221 Among East African emigrants to 
the United States, Somali-Americans suffer the highest unemployment rate, have higher 
poverty rates, and see the lowest rates of college graduation.222 Many of those recruited 
by al-Shabab have lived in impoverished communities in Minneapolis.223 
The Somali youth who were radicalized by al-Shabab have been categorized as 
“Generation 1.5.” Although native to Somalia, they have no real recollection of it due to 
spending most of their childhood in refugee camps in other parts of Africa or resettling in 
the United States while still very young.224 Despite immigrating with their parents, these 
youth have felt a disconnect from their families, whom they perceive as not available for 
support. Predominantly single-parent households or the parents’ lack of time to dedicate 
to—or provide oversight of—their children while providing for the family augments this 
perception.225 
Identity crises and the transition to adulthood have also played a critical role in the 
radicalization process.226 The absence of role models for these refugee youth, specifically 
male role models, combined with the strain of trying to fit in or navigate multiple 
identities—Somali, American, Muslim, and Africa-American—has made them more 
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susceptible to negative forces, including al-Shabab recruiters.227 Issues with cultural 
identity within this community have been more prevalent than within other similarly 
situated refugee populations. Ultimately, these factors have made them more vulnerable to 
recruitment and radicalization by al-Shabab.228 
Perhaps most central to the vulnerability of Somali-American refugees is being part 
of an insulated community. Somali culture is rooted in clannism and a deep-seated identity 
tied to lineage, culture, and religion.229 One of the biggest challenges to acculturation 
found within the Somali refugee community is the language barrier. While Somali 
immigrants are told that learning English is critically important to successful resettlement, 
they do not receive English language training until after their arrival in the United 
States.230 This absence of language training stands in stark contrast to the language and 
cultural education received by other refugee communities before being resettled in the 
United States. As noted by the NCTC, the limited time spent with Somali refugees before 
migration to the United States contributes to the immediate widening of the cultural gap 
upon their resettlement.231 
In preying on this sense of isolation, recruiters have relied on creating a sense of 
belonging for these disenfranchised youth by emphasizing their cultural identity as Somalis 
and an idealized picture of their homeland.232 The feeling of being “othered,” or perceived 
as being an outsider in their own communities, has led some to seek re-culturation outside 
their country of resettlement and, ultimately, extremist activity.233 
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3. Comparable Problems in Canada and Australia 
During this same timeframe, it is estimated that approximately 20–25 Canadian 
Somali youth also traveled overseas to fight with al-Shabab.234 The details about these 
individual recruits remain unknown as the issue is mostly unstudied. At least one set of 
researchers sought to ascertain what might make Somali refugees in Canada vulnerable to 
radicalization efforts. 
An estimated 200,000 Somalis live in Canada.235 As in Minneapolis, the Somali 
refugee community in the area of Toronto, Ontario, is the largest of its kind in the 
country.236 Like their U.S. counterparts, members of this Canadian refugee community 
live in low-income areas, but unlike other immigrant communities, they do not seem to 
advance out of poverty over time. In Canada, as in the United States, Somali refugees are 
“hypermarginalized” and suffer from widespread stigmatization.237 
The issue of Somali radicalization in Australia has happened concurrently with the 
traveler phenomena in both Canada and the United States. In 2007, the Australian 
government began an investigation into accounts of Somali-Australians traveling overseas 
to fight with al-Shabab.238 Ultimately, there was insufficient evidence to bring charges 
against any specific individuals.239 It is estimated that nearly 40 Somali-Australians were 
among this group, two of whom were confirmed to have been killed in conflict there.240 
In addition to these travelers, at least one Somali refugee was convicted of 
attempted terrorism within Australia. In 2009, Saney Edow Aweys was arrested with  
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four co-conspirators for planning to attack the Holsworthy military base in Sydney.241 
Officials learned that they had attempted to seek permission and support from al-Shabab 
in carrying out this attack. They participated in multiple telephone discussions with 
al-Shabab-affiliated clerics in Somalia and had sent at least one individual to receive 
military training from the terrorist organization.242 
While the issue of radicalization from within the Somali diaspora in Australia is 
mostly unstudied, much research has been done on the Lebanese-Australian population, of 
whom one member was convicted alongside Aweys as part of Operation Neath.243 In 
Australia, Somalia does not even rank in the top 10 origin nations of resettled Muslim 
refugees.244 Lebanese-born Australians, however, comprise the largest proportion of the 
nation’s foreign-born Muslims, at approximately 30 percent of that population. They have 
been heavily studied due to their disproportionately high rates of participation in terrorist 
plots within the country.245 
The study of Australian extremists of Lebanese origin demonstrates several 
parallels to the findings regarding radicalized Somali refugees from Canada and the United 
States. Like their Somali-American counterparts, Lebanese-Australian extremists are 
typically poorly educated, especially in comparison to other Australian Muslims.246 
Another similarity between the groups lies in their low economic status and lack of 
employment opportunities. Most notably, many Lebanese Muslims live in insulated 
communities on the margins of Australian society, with limited socialization among the 
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4. Common Threads across Continents 
Many studies on homegrown terrorism have found no specific demographic 
markers for those who radicalize.248 Others have tied religious ideology to radicalization 
of Muslim youth.249 However, a closer examination of the Somali diasporic communities 
in both the United States and Canada and the Lebanese immigrant community in Australia 
reveals there may be some exceptions to this rule. Across all three populations, several key 
factors played a role in making individuals from within these communities susceptible to 
radicalization. A lack of education or other opportunity, particularly employment, was a 
shared factor for radicalization among all three groups. The most striking similarity across 
these three immigrant populations was their isolation and inability to effectively integrate 
into the society of their host countries; these findings echo a sentiment raised in existing 
research as to whether diasporic communities can ever fully integrate into their host 
societies.250 Marginalization of these communities, along with stigmatization from their 
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IV. POLICY SUGGESTIONS TO MITIGATE THE RISK 
OF REFUGEE RADICALIZATION 
The choice is not between the current crisis and blissful isolation. The 
choice is between the current crisis and an orderly, managed system of mass 
migration. You can have one or the other. There is no easy middle ground. 
 —Patrick Kingsley251 
Despite data indicating that the risk of a domestic terrorist attack from within the 
refugee community in the United States is extremely low, the perceived risks associated 
with accepting refugees and other immigrants are higher than in decades past. The U.S. 
government responded to these perceived risks in the last three years through a drastic 
reduction in refugee resettlement numbers and a temporary cessation of travel from certain 
high-risk countries.252 Instead of curtailing refugee admissions, U.S. policymakers should 
consider a shift in the approach to the current refugee admissions program. Canada’s 
refugee program allows for involvement of its citizens in the admissions process; no 
parallel process currently exists in U.S. refugee policy. These Canadian programs have 
achieved great success in increasing the ability of refugees to integrate in their host country 
and create involved citizens. They also have the benefit of increasing the involvement of 
existing Canadian citizens in the refugee process—narrowing the cultural gap that can exist 
between resettled refugees and other members of society and promoting human interest 
and connection across these populations. 
A. CURRENT REFUGEE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The current tone on refugee admissions and policy was set in the first few months 
of the Trump administration with the passage of two executive orders limiting the scope of 
USRAP.253 The initial order temporarily suspended travel from a list of majority-Muslim 
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countries, suspended USRAP for 120 days, banned the entry of Syrians as refugees, and 
proclaimed that resettlement of more than 50,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017 was not in 
the national interest of the United States.254 
That order was enjoined from enforcement, and its successor order was 
substantially identical, with the exception of one nation of origin being removed from 
barred entry.255 This order was also enjoined though the Supreme Court later lifted that 
injunction in part, affirming it with respect to the suspension of refugee admissions.256 
After months of consultations with DHS and DOS, the White House issued its final 
iteration of this policy via presidential proclamation.257 This proclamation indicated that 
several nations across the globe were deficient in their ability to identify and share 
information about potential terrorists, and as such, their nationals would be, with limited 
exception, barred from entry to the United States.258 
Ultimately, the proclamation did not impose further restrictions on USRAP, as the 
initial pause and assessment had already concluded by the time of its issuance. The negative 
posture toward refugees continues under other actions of the Trump administration. It is 
reflected in persisting limitations on refugee resettlement, with admissions set at 
historically low numbers despite ongoing crises around the globe that have led to record 
numbers of refugees.259 The shuttering of resettlement programs across the nation due to 
the reduction in refugee admissions and states’ opposition to providing services is further 
evidence of this negativity.260 
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B. MITIGATION VIA MULTICULTURALISM 
As the research regarding resettled refugee communities in the United States, 
Canada, and Australia demonstrates, this contracting of refugee admissions and further 
isolation of these populations will not serve to mitigate the risk of terrorism that the 
executive orders purported to address. Instead, policymakers should look to the examples 
of multiculturalism and refugee integration to develop effective mitigation strategies. 
From the 1970s through the late 1990s, Australia followed an immigration policy 
of multiculturalism.261 Its goal was to facilitate integration of immigrants and create a 
more diverse society. Multiculturalism emphasized the need for all Australians to possess 
a shared allegiance to the nation, respect for its laws, and adherence to principles such as 
freedom of speech, democracy, and tolerance. It also stressed the right of all Australians to 
their own beliefs and cultures, and a duty to respect those of other cultures and belief 
systems.262 This policy of multiculturalism served Australia extremely well during its 
tenure, though this was prior to 9/11 and its global aftermath. 
Mirroring some key principles from the public policy of multiculturalism, the 
government of Canada has been using various refugee sponsorship programs for many 
years. These programs have allowed for increased integration of refugees into Canadian 
society. Canada’s approach to refugee admissions is a model that the United States could 
emulate to mitigate the risk of creating or maintaining isolated refugee communities, the 
existence of which is known to be a primary factor in radicalization. 
Canada has a long and rich history of accepting refugees. From the British loyalists 
who fled there during the American Revolution, through the passing of the 1976 
Immigration Act, to today, immigrants have sought and received protection from the 
Canadian government.263 In particular, Canada’s response to the Indochinese refugee 
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crisis of the late 1970s has been touted as a model for future resettlement programs.264 The 
private sponsorship resettlement program in Canada was developed 40 years ago. Based 
on the desire of Canadian citizens to help refugees, the program was created to work in 
concert with the existing government resettlement program and alleviate some of the 
burden of refugee resettlement from the government.265 At its onset during the Indochinese 
crisis, private sponsorship was used to direct the actions of engaged Canadian citizens. 
Although private sponsorship existed before the crisis, it had not been used frequently. 
Refugee resettlement via private sponsorships spiked from fewer than 100 in the spring of 
1979 to more than 34,000 between 1979 and 1980.266 This blending of community and 
governmental responsibility for the resettlement of refugees sometimes becomes a political 
tug of war but has mostly met with success. 
The private sponsorship programs of Canada’s refugee admissions work in one of 
five ways. The first allows for certain designated organizations to assist in supporting 
refugees overseas or during the resettlement process in Canada.267 Over 1,000 such 
organizations exist with signed sponsorship agreements with the Canadian government. 
The second option is through the groups-of-five program, which allows five or more 
Canadian permanent residents or citizens to sponsor a refugee to immigrate to Canada; 
these refugees must already have status granted by UNHCR.268 A third form of private 
sponsorship is community-based, in which a community organization can sponsor 
UNHCR-approved refugees to come to Canada. These organizations then agree to provide 
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emotional and financial support for the refugees in their first year in the country.269 The 
fourth of these programs is the Joint Assistance Program, which allows Immigration, 
Refugee and Citizenship, Canada, to partner with organizations to resettle refugees with 
special needs.270 Finally, in 2013, the Canadian government developed the Blended Visa 
Office-Referred Program, which matches private sponsors with refugees but splits the cost 
of their resettlement and support.271 
In addition to the humanitarian success of the program, subsequent studies of 
Indochinese refugee populations demonstrated that those who had been resettled through 
private sponsorship had a more successful integration into Canadian society.272 The 
10-year investigation into the psychological, economic, and social adaptation of the 
Indochinese diaspora revealed that private sponsors went above and beyond what was 
required of them in supporting their beneficiaries. Sponsors act as a refugee’s first guide to 
new society, and data suggests that this sponsor contact has helped with long-term 
adaptation.273 
During the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016, the government of Canada called 
on private sponsors to help the country meet UNHCR’s request to admit 100,000 Syrian 
refugees.274 While the nation committed to this admission, it was Canadian citizens who 
ultimately helped respond by resettling more Syrian refugees than the Canadian 
government.275 
 
269 “Community Sponsors: About the Process,” Government of Canada, last modified November 24, 
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C. PRACTICAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The United States budgeted nearly $2.19 billion for refugee assistance services for 
fiscal year 2019 and $1.91 billion for fiscal year 2020.276 Nearly one quarter or more of 
those funds are allocated for transitional and refugee support services.277 In part, the role 
of the Canadian sponsorship programs is to alleviate funding burdens on the Canadian 
government and divert the costs associated with resettling and supporting refugees to 
private citizens and organizations. While private sponsorship will not alleviate the 
administrative burdens on USRAP for processing of refugees, it can reduce some of the 
ancillary costs associated with resettlement and societal integration. Those financial 
demands can be diverted away from the average taxpayer to private sponsors. 
Implementing such a program would require drafting parameters and application 
forms for sponsorship. Existing USCIS personnel would have to be trained, or new 
positions within DHS would need to be created, to process those applications. Guidelines 
for secure vetting of private sponsors and organizations would need to be developed, and 
DHS personnel would need to be trained on those procedures. Existing USCIS personnel 
would need to be trained, or new positions created, to act as liaisons between USRAP and 
private sponsors. These liaison positions would be critical in ensuring continued 
compliance and security through the refugee’s first year of admission and before his or her 
adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident. 
Integration with DOS and HHS would also be critical in ensuring correct allocation 
of funds for resettlement and access to community resources. While community 
organizations currently receive funding from the U.S. government to provide significant 
assistance with refugee resettlement, introducing a private sponsorship component to 
USRAP could enhance the effectiveness of these existing programs and create more 
concrete ties between refugees and their communities of resettlement. Private sponsors 
would alleviate some of the burden currently on ORR, as they should fill the role of 
 
276 “Operating Plan for FY 2020,” Administration for Children and Families, accessed October 20, 
2020, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/olab/fy_2020_acf_operating_plan_web_version.pdf. 
277 Administration for Children and Families.  
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community liaison for the refugees they sponsor and provide for some of the more basic 
needs that ORR now addresses for the general refugee population. 
Developing a program similar to Canada’s private sponsorship resettlement would 
allow the government of the United States to continue to meet the growing demands of 
ongoing humanitarian crises across the globe while simultaneously promoting community 
integration of refugees. This program would serve to stem the risk of radicalization from 
within this population of immigrants. Shifting some responsibility for humanitarian aid 
onto U.S. citizens who actively seek to assist refugees would allow the U.S. government 
to encourage community partnerships with refugee populations. Such a move would ensure 
that areas where refugees resettle are receptive to having them, can work to transition them 
into their new lives, and integrate them into their new homes. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addressed the following questions: Is radicalization of resettled refugees 
a significant threat to the security of the United States? Which factors contribute to the 
violent radicalization of resettled refugees within the United States or in other countries? 
What can be done to mitigate the risk of radicalization from within the resettled refugee 
community? 
To assess the scope of the potential threat to the United States from resettled 
refugees, qualitative and quantitative data about terrorist incidents and attempts perpetrated 
by refugees was assessed. Over 40 years of data revealed only a handful of successful 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by refugees within the United States, of which only two were 
deadly. Although fatal attacks from refugees within the United States were not found to be 
a significant threat, research demonstrates that members of resettled refugee communities 
are being radicalized to participate in terrorist activity outside of the United States. This 
radicalization is, itself, a threat to national security and should be addressed. 
To determine what can be done to mitigate the risk of radicalization within a 
community, one must understand what common factors, if any, are contributing to that risk 
and take appropriate steps to mitigate them. Recent political rhetoric would have the 
American public believe that refugees have a high likelihood of being terrorists before they 
even enter the United States. The research, however, shows that the root causes of this 
radicalization are psychosocial and cultural issues experienced after resettlement. To 
mitigate this risk, policymakers must reassess what steps are being taken to ensure 
integration of refugees into the host society instead of allowing for conditions that 
contribute to isolation and division between refugees and citizens of the United States. 
The historical context for refugee admissions to the United States—detailing 
various pieces of legislation passed with respect to refugees between the 1800s and today—
demonstrates the evolution of U.S. refugee law, from reactionary and politically driven 
bursts of admission or exclusion of individuals based on specific criteria to its current state, 
driven primarily by humanitarian need. 
56 
The current refugee admissions process in the United States is lengthy, from 
designation as a refugee by UNHCR to eventual entry to the United States. During that 
process, the United States works closely with international partners to interview refugee 
applicants and conduct robust screening and vetting of all individuals seeking admission 
through USRAP. Once they arrive in the United States, there are limited financial and 
social resources available to refugees. The number of service providers has contracted in 
recent years, leaving a gap to be filled in the space of refugee integration and certain areas 
of the country with no resources for these new residents. 
The scope of the threat to the United States posed by resettled refugees is a minimal 
one. Existing databases and research analyses of terrorist attacks in the United States 
demonstrate no pattern of domestic terrorist activity within the refugee community in the 
last 50 years. Although early refugee terrorists were politically driven, terrorist activity 
attempted or committed by recent refugees has generally been religiously motivated or not 
tied to any specific ideology. 
Several common factors might lead a refugee to radicalization to extremist activity, 
even if that activity is not perpetrated in the refugee’s host country. Members of the Somali 
diaspora in the United States and Canada share many of the same experiences and 
struggles, both suffering from identity issues and isolation. These challenges have made 
many Somali refugee youth in both countries susceptible to radicalization. Lebanese 
refugees, whose experience in Australia mirrored the Somalis’ isolation and identity crisis, 
radicalized in significant numbers to terrorist activity abroad. Based on these examples, 
policies to deter radicalization from within refugee communities should focus on 
integration of refugees into their host societies and provide opportunities for those refugees 
to identify as true members of their new homes. 
The Canadian government’s positive experience with Indochinese refugees 
supports the suggestion that U.S. policymakers implement a new approach to refugee 
admissions. The Canadian refugee program allows for a level of individual or group 
involvement of citizens in the admissions process that has no equivalent in current U.S. 
operations. The success of these Canadian programs in integrating refugees into Canadian 
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society demonstrates that a comparable arm of USRAP may serve to provide similarly 
increased integration of refugees into the United States. 
This thesis maintains that limiting the number of refugee admissions to the United 
States does not serve the national interest but hampers the ability of refugees to fully 
integrate into American society. Shrinking the number of refugees in this country will only 
serve to further isolate them, when what is needed to mitigate any potential for 
radicalization from within their ranks is inclusion and full membership in their new 
communities. Adding a piece to USRAP that mirrors Canada’s current blended refugee 
admissions and allows U.S. citizens to participate actively in the resettlement and 
integration process is the best tool policymakers can employ to address any threat from 
accepting refugees for resettlement in the United States. 
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